What Happened on December 2 in Venezuela? A View from the Outside

When I booked tickets for a recent trip to Venezuela, I was looking forward to arriving in the midst of celebration. However, when I arrived in Caracas two days after the recent December 2, 2007 referendum, the atmosphere felt different. This was my fifth visit to Venezuela in the last four years, and it was the first time that the ambience felt, well – deflated. I spent the next three weeks talking to dozens of people from east to west – and was interested in the level of complex analysis and passionate opinion about what went wrong (or in the case of opposition supporters – what went right).

With an approximate 50/51-49% victory for the “No” campaign, it’s important to keep in perspective that the opposition made no real gains in this referendum, other than a boost in morale. Their level of support was more or less the same it has been in the last 9 votes since 1998 – this deserves some reflection. Regardless, watching the rabidly opposition television channel Globovision – you would think they had converted millions of revolutionaries to capitalism overnight.

It’s not so much that the “No” side won; rather, the big losers were the people who believe in and support President Hugo Chavez (still overwhelmingly the majority of the population). Here is my interpretation of what went wrong with the referendum, after talking to people in the cities and countryside in Venezuela in December (in no particular order of importance):

Crippling absention.

The level of abstention in the December 2 referendum was close to 50% -- that’s half of the country’s eligible voters. So, half of the country’s eligible voters decided this event just wasn’t important enough to turn up and vote. This reflects the trend in Venezuela toward “presidential” voting – preferring to turn out in big numbers for presidential elections, but let someone else decide who runs their cities, states, and in this case – letting someone else decide the future of their country.

Comando Razzamatazz

The “Yes” campaign organizers appointed by President Chavez, Comando Zamora, made some serious tactical errors. The central command of the campaign was orchestrated by Vice President Jorge Rodriguez, National Assembly deputies Carlos Escarrá, Gabriela Ramirez and Dario Vivas, President of Telesur, Andrés Izarra, Governor of Miranda State, Diosdado Cabello, Foreign Minister, Nicolas Maduro, Communications and Information Minister, William Lara, and his Vice-Minister Helena Salcedo.

In my judgment, the campaign made two serious tactical errors:

1) Too much razzamatazz, not enough door-to-door grassroots campaigning (translation = not enough participatory democracy). In true Chavista style, there were lots of flashy posters, billboards, red t-shirts and hats, mega-marches, slogans, and TV ads – but not enough grassroots campaigning and democratic debate.
2) More importantly, the “Yes” campaign relied on the fledgling PSUV to carry the word and organize local participation, when they should have enlisted the established grassroots communal councils, which are already operating in much of the country. The fledgling PSUV has barely solidified its presence, and has been plagued by internal problems.

Too much of a good thing?

Many people told me they found the wording of some of the proposals confusing, and that there were too many proposals – which caused additional confusion. The original slate consisted of 33 proposals by President Chavez. After a public process of debate, as well as three rounds of debate in the National Assembly, an additional 36 proposals were added. Many people I spoke with said they found the quantity overwhelming. The sheer volume may have caused some to give up in exasperation.

A well-funded, relentless, consistently disassociated opposition.

It’s no surprise that the opposition mounted a relentless and sustained campaign, funded by the US government and allies. Putting aside the sometimes ridiculous misinformation for a second, the opposition managed to effectively infiltrate its half-truths and manipulations into the innermost barrios of Caracas. They enlisted the wealthy student population of private universities who engaged in a number of violent protests that grabbed international media attention. The students were suppposedly funded and trained by US agencies and supported by opposition political parties (which, no doubt, their parents already support). It’s important to note that the opposition students represent approximately 5% of the total Venezuelan student population. In Sucre, I was told that the Podemos party paid people to campaign in communities against the reforms. The governor of Sucre state is from Podemos (formerly supporters of the government), and he waged a sustained campaign against the reforms. Interestingly, despite the well-funded “No” campaign, the “Yes” vote won in Sucre.

Wholesale anti-reform international media campaign.

The opposition media (which still control the majority of audience share in Venezuela) was instrumental, along with its international corporate media counterparts, in spreading rumours and misinformation.

Shamefully, the international media was an accomplice to the opposition in their misinformation campaign, including the CBC, the CTV, Globe and Mail, and Toronto Star here in Canada. The international media concentrated on the issues of continuous re-election, extended presidential periods, and centralization of control of the Central Bank of Venezuela; yet they ignored the large majority of reforms that would have decentralized power in Venezuela – giving more decision-making and administrative power to local people’s councils, and the benefits to workers, families and peasant farmers. When the “No” vote won – Venezuela was heralded as a bastion of democracy. Would the same margin of victory by the “Yes” vote have evoked the same empty rhetoric? If the ability to be continuously re-elected is OK for Stephen Harper – why is it off limits for Venezuela?

The contra-revolutionary bad seed within the revolution.

One of the most consistent complaints I heard from those I spoke to in Venezuela was the threat of the counter revolution within the revolution. Outside Caracas, the most common criticism was the undermining of the potential reforms by governors and mayors that supposedly support the Bolivarian government. Many feel that corrupt, red shirt wearing governors and mayors that are enjoying their new-found sense of power were not supportive of proposals that would see local popular power entrenched in the constitution, thereby, undermining their own power. Whether it is true or just well-placed rumour, corruption by bureaucrats and politicians is one of the key criticisms people have, and it is damaging the revolutionary movement.

And now for the good news.

Those that did vote “Yes” are not about to give up – particularly in the countryside, where the benefits of the revolution are slower in manifesting themselves, and where they have less comforts to lose than those in Caracas. In a small remote parish of Sucre state, to the peasant communities of Yaracuy, to the communal councils of Rio Tocuyo -- those that believe in the reforms are commited to seeing them through. This movement has begun already with the organization of a campaign to have them introduced through popular power (one of the four ways to introduce constitutional reforms). Reforms introduced by the people, through a serious and democratic grassroots debate, may be the best chance the revolution has to push forward.